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I. Introduction
The False Claims Act (FCA)1 is a civil anti-fraud statute
covering the intersection between the private sector and the
government.2 Originally designed to shield against contractor
fraud during the Civil War,3 the FCA is now one of the
government’s primary weapons for attacking potential fraud in
industries that accept federal funds.4 In the 2015 fiscal year, the
government recovered over $3.5 billion in FCA settlements and
judgments, compared to just over $1 billion in 2005 and $500
million in 1995.5 As modern FCA litigation evolves in a climate
where federal programs become more and more intertwined with
the economy, the government and private plaintiffs have sought to
use a mathematical process known as “statistical sampling” or
“extrapolation” to facilitate the efficient resolution of large cases.6

1. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012) (creating liability for fraudulent acts
against the government).
2. See 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 1-5 (4th
ed. 2011) (summarizing the FCA’s history and purpose).
3. See id. (describing Congress’s motivation in enacting the FCA).
4. See David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private
Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under
the False Claims Act, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1707 (2013) (noting the trends in
modern FCA litigation).
5. See Fraud Statistics—Overview 1–2, DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 23, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/796866/download (last visited Oct. 27, 2017)
(providing statistics on FCA recoveries since 1987) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
6. See United States v. Life Care Centers of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549,
560 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (listing previous cases where a party attempted to use
statistical sampling).
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Statistical sampling is a process where the parties try a small
sample out of a larger body of claims in a bellwether trial.7 An
expert witness then extrapolates the rate of claims proved false in
that sample to the larger body of claims.8 In the FCA context,
courts have generally recognized statistical sampling as an
acceptable method for calculating damages where liability is
uncontested or previously determined.9
The purpose of this Note is to examine the legal arguments
underlying the question of whether statistical sampling can
establish FCA liability as a matter of law. Relators10 and the
government consider sampling to be “indispensable” in their
efforts to “combat increasingly widespread and systemic” fraud,11
while defendants argue that statistical sampling is poorly suited
7. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBURG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:11 (5th
ed. 2013) (describing bellwether trials as a potential solution for “situation[s] that
ha[ve] engendered hundreds or thousands of individual . . . cases,” and stating
that plaintiffs use bellwether trials to approximate the strength of all the claims).
A bellwether trial deals with only a portion of a larger case that can serve as a
test for the potential success of the remaining portions of the case. See id.
(“Because the few help lead to settlement of the whole, they are labeled
‘bellwether,’ in reference to the male sheep (wether) adorned with a bell to lead
his flock.”).
8. See id. § 11:21 (discussing the concept of statistical sampling).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., No. 3:07–CV–00604–
M, 2016 WL 3449833, at *12 n.100 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2016) (noting statistical
sampling’s use in FCA litigation for damages calculations); United States v.
Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240–41 (D.P.R. 2000) (applying statistical
sampling in calculating damages only). When using statistical sampling to prove
damages, the government attempts to prove the dollar amount of overpayment
for a sample number of claims, then extrapolates that amount of average
overpayment per claim to every claim in the full universe for a grand total amount
of overpayment. See United States v. Fadul, No. DKC 11–0885, 2013 WL 781614,
at *14 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2013) (explaining a statistical sampling methodology for
calculating damages).
10. See MCKENNA LONGA, ALDRIDGE LLP & RONALD A. KIENLEN, GOV’T
CONTRACT DISPUTES § 23:8 (2016) (defining the term “relator”). Whenever this
Note references the government as a litigation party, it intends to also incorporate
relators because they litigate on behalf of the government. See id. (same).
11. Public Brief for the United States as Intervenor-Appellee at 39, United
States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 15–2145 (4th Cir. Oct. 26,
2016).
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for proving the FCA’s essential elements.12 In 2014, a district court
in Tennessee ruled for the first time13 in United States v. Life Care
Centers of America, Inc.14 that statistical sampling could establish
liability under the FCA.15 More recently, a Texas district court
ruled in United States v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc.16 that statistical
sampling could not establish FCA liability.17 The question of
whether statistical sampling can ever be used to establish FCA
liability is an emerging issue that a federal appellate court has not
yet decided.18
Courts could rule on statistical sampling’s permissibility on
two distinct grounds. The first is an evidentiary determination as
to whether a particular methodology meets the scientific criteria
set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.19 The
12. Brief of Defendants-Appellees Agape Senior Community Inc., et al. at
19, United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 15–2145 (4th
Cir. Feb. 14, 2017).
13. See Case Comment, False Claims Act—Proof of Liability—Eastern
District of Tennessee Rules that Statistical Extrapolation May Suffice to Prove
Liability—United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., Nos.
1:08-CV-251, 1:12-CV-64, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142660 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29,
2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2081 (2015) (discussing Life Care and its impact).
14. 114 F. Supp. 3d 549 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).
15. See id. at 571 (allowing statistical sampling to establish liability).
16. No. 3:07–CV–00604–M, 2016 WL 3449833 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2016).
17. See id. at *13 (ruling that “proof regarding one claim does not meet
Relator's burden of proof regarding other claims” in addition to finding that the
particular expert’s methodology was flawed).
18. See id. at *12 (acknowledging a split amongst district courts in several
circuits).
19. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also United States ex rel. Loughren v.
UnumProvident Corp., 604 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 (D. Mass. 2009) (excluding the
relator’s methodology of statistical sampling for establishing FCA liability due to
insufficient reliability). Daubert requires trial judges to “ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable” under
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702. 509 U.S. at 589; see also FED. R. EVID. 702
(permitting expert witness testimony where it is based on “(a) the expert’s
scientific . . . knowledge [that] will help the trier of fact . . . determine a fact in
issue, (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts . . . .”). The Federal Rules of
Evidence and Daubert govern the admissibility of statistical sampling testimony,
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second is a legal determination as to whether FCA liability can
ever be established using statistical sampling.20 This Note focuses
on sampling’s legal sufficiency for proving FCA liability.
Part II will outline the promulgation and operation of the
FCA, as well as statistical sampling as it relates to both the FCA
and liability in other contexts.21 Part III will discuss the recent
split among the district courts regarding whether statistical
sampling can establish FCA liability.22 Part IV will analyze how
which is a separate analysis from evaluating its legal sufficiency for proving each
FCA element. See United States v. Life Care Centers of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp.
3d 549, 572 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (noting that the court’s determination “does not
decide the parties’ pending motions regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony”). Statistical sampling introduces a range of evidentiary concerns
regarding the scientific reliability of any given sampling methodology, the
problems with the accuracy of a sample’s representation of the whole universe
under examination, the so-called “blue bus” problem and the fairness concerns it
raises, and the prohibition of propensity evidence under the Federal Rules of
Evidence Rule 404(b). See Neil Issar, More Data Mining for Medical
Misrepresentation? Admissibility of Statistical Proof Derived from Predictive
Methods of Detecting Medical Reimbursement Fraud, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 341, 360–
73 (2015) (discussing evidentiary issues with statistical sampling in healthcare
fraud). Despite the evidentiary concerns with statistical sampling, one circuit
court has found that statistical sampling can at least be used at the pleading
stage. See United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic
Co., 839 F.3d 242, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (reviewing a motion to dismiss a
complaint basing its allegations off a statistical sampling methodology). Although
the samples were likely not “an accurate proxy” for the claims in question, the
Third Circuit found that sampling could support a complaint’s plausibility when
judged without “any credibility determination[.]” Id. That court noted its
skepticism of the methodology’s validity, but ruled that such skepticism was not
best placed at the pleading stage. See id. at 257 (“There is little evidence to show
that [the relator’s] unusual procedure of reviewing eBay listings is an accurate
proxy for the universe of [the defendant’s] products available for sale in the
United States.”). This pleading determination and the evidentiary admissibility
of statistical sampling are closely related issues to the topic of this Note, but
should not be confused with the question of statistical sampling’s legal sufficiency
for proving FCA liability.
20. See United States v. Life Care Centers of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549,
571 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (ruling on whether statistical sampling is “a legally viable
mechanism, which the Government may employ in attempting to prove . . . FCA
claims”).
21. Infra Part II. The False Claims Act and Statistical Sampling
22. Infra Part III. The Split on Statistical Sampling in the FCA Context
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statistical sampling relates to the FCA’s liability requirements and
address the associated burden shifting and due process concerns.23
Part V concludes that the FCA requires the government to identify
each false claim individually to establish liability.24
II. The False Claims Act and Statistical Sampling
This Part provides a brief historical overview of the FCA and
discusses the statute’s current structure. It then examines
previous uses of statistical sampling for damages calculations in
the FCA context and explores cases from other areas of law that
consider the use of statistical sampling for establishing liability.
A. History of the FCA
Congress enacted the FCA in 1863 as a tool for “prevent[ing]
and punish[ing] frauds upon the government of the United
States.”25 Concern with “frauds and corruptions practiced in
obtaining pay from the government during the [Civil War]”
motivated a forceful legislative response.26 The Act created liability
for a number of actions negatively affecting the government fisc,27
set the damages and penalties that the government can recover,28
and permitted private citizens to bring suit on behalf of the

23. Infra Part IV. The Legal Sufficiency of Statistical Sampling for Proving
FCA Liability
24. Infra Part V. Conclusion
25. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
26. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863).
27. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat. 696, (defining violations of
the Act).
28. See id. § 3 (establishing double damages, civil penalties, and costs to be
assessed against private citizens found in violation of the statute and for court
marshals in cases involving military personnel).
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government.29 FCA suits brought by private citizen plaintiffs are
known as qui tam actions.30
In 1986, Congress amended the FCA in order to better
facilitate qui tam actions,31 increase recoveries by raising the
damages multiplier and civil penalties,32 define the scienter
requirement,33 and clearly establish preponderance of the evidence
as the burden of proof for each FCA element.34 The Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA)35 again amended
the FCA36 to remove a judicially created requirement that false
claims be presented to a government employee.37 This amendment
also created a statutory definition for the materiality element.38
There have also been two more recent amendments that are not
relevant to statistical sampling.39
29. See id. § 4 (allowing a private person to bring suit under the Act on
behalf of the government).
30. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 768–69 (2000) (examining the ability of relators to bring qui tam actions
on behalf of the government).
31. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986) (“The proposed legislation seeks . . .
to provide the Government’s law enforcers with more effective tools . . . .”).
32. See id. at 17 (increasing the damages multiplier and penalties).
33. See id. at 20 (clarifying the definition of knowledge under the FCA).
34. See id. at 30–31 (stating the burden of proof under the FCA).
35. Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621 (2009) (amending the FCA).
36. See id. (amending the FCA); see also S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10–11 (2009)
(altering language in the FCA relied upon by the Supreme Court in Allison Engine
Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008), when determining
that the FCA required an intent “to get” the government to pay the amount falsely
claimed).
37. See Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S.
662, 668–69 (2008) (basing an additional intent requirement that a defendant
have the “purpose of getting a false . . . claim paid or approved by the Government”
on the language “to get”).
38. See S. REP. NO. 111-10 at 12 (2009) (“[T]he new term ‘material’ is defined
later in this section to mean ‘having a natural tendency to influence, or being
capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.’”).
39. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901 (2010) (modifying the public disclosure bar);
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1079A(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2079–80 (2010) (amending the FCA’s
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B. The FCA in Its Present Form
The FCA creates liability for seven types of conduct against
the government: (1) direct submission of a false claim, (2) creation
of false records material to a false claim, (3) conspiracy to violate
the FCA, (4) incomplete delivery of government money or property,
(5) delivery of a false receipt of government property use, (6)
purchase of property from a government employee where the sale
is unlawful, and (7) making a false claim to avoid or reduce
obligations to pay the government.40 The direct false claim, which
is a claim that “cause[s] the United States to [wrongly] remit
money directly to claimants,”41 makes up the vast majority of FCA
litigation.42
The federal circuit courts broadly agree that to establish FCA
liability for a direct false claim, a relator or the government must
establish at a minimum that (1) the defendant made a claim for
payment to the government, (2) that claim was false, and (3) the
defendant knew that claim to be false.43 Some circuits go one step
farther, at least in implied false certification cases,44 by requiring
proof that the false claim was material to the government’s
retaliation language).
40.
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (2012) (creating liability for the
listed acts).
41. United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports Corp., 160 F. Supp. 3d
253, 255 (D.D.C. 2016).
42. See 1 BOESE, supra note 2, § 2.01(A)(1) (predicting this post-1986 trend
to continue after the FERA amendments).
43. See id. (listing what “most courts have concluded are at least [the] three
essential elements” of a direct false claim); United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United
Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 304–05 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing the elements
necessary to establish FCA liability); United States ex rel. Presser v. Acacia
Mental Health Clinic, LLC, 836 F.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 2016) (same); Olson v.
Fairview Health Servs. of Minn., 831 F.3d 1063, 1070 (8th Cir. 2016) (same);
United States ex rel. Davis v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 120, 124 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (same).
44. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136
S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016) (approving the implied false certification theory, which
is where “a defendant makes representations in submitting a claim but omits its
violations of statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements . . . .”).
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decision to pay.45 Given that some cases involving sampling may
be implied false certification cases, this Note will also consider the
materiality element.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo46 noted the importance of considering the elements of
a particular cause of action when determining whether statistical
evidence can be used for proving classwide liability.47 Therefore,
an examination of each FCA element is necessary to determine
whether statistical sampling can be used to establish FCA liability.
1. The Claim Element
The FCA creates liability for the submission of “a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”48 A claim is “any
request or demand” made for “money or property” either owned or
reimbursable by the government.49 Government salaries and nostrings-attached income subsidies are excepted from this
definition.50 Courts interpret the term “claim” to incorporate “all
fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of

45. See United States ex rel. Rostholder v. Omnicare, Inc., 745 F.3d 694, 700
(4th Cir. 2014) (requiring the materiality element); United States v. Bollinger
Shipyards, Inc., 775 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2014) (same); United States ex rel.
Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 816 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2016) (same);
United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2016)
(same).
46. 136 S. Ct. 1039 (2016).
47. See id. at 1046 (stating the importance of a particular cause of action
and its elements in determining the appropriateness of using statistical evidence).
48. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012).
49. Id. § 3729(b)(2)(A).
50. See id. § 3729(b)(2)(B) (stating that a claim “does not include requests
or demands for money or property that the Government has paid to an individual
as compensation for Federal employment or as an income subsidy with no
restrictions on that individual's use of the money or property”).
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money.”51 This includes claims that a defendant causes a third
person to submit.52 Thus, these claims can take a variety of forms.53
Proof of a “call upon the public fisc”54 is “central” to an FCA
cause of action because the statute “focuses on the submission of a
claim.”55 The FCA creates liability for the claim itself, not for a
fraudulent scheme or other related action.56 Thus, the mere
implication that a false claim exists in light of a fraudulent scheme
will not substitute for proof of “a real false claim.”57 Accordingly,
FCA actions cannot survive unless the government proves the
existence of an “actual false claim[].”58 The question that arises in
51. United States v. Neifert–White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968).
52. See United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 367, 376
(D. Mass. 2010) (“The Supreme Court has long held that a person may be liable
under the FCA for causing an innocent third party to submit a false claim to the
government without knowing it is false.” (citing United States v. Bornstein, 423
U.S. 303, 313 (1976))).
53. See 1 BOESE, supra note 2, § 2.02(B)(1) (listing different submissions
characterized as claims by courts, including “progress report[s] and voucher[s] for
government contractors”).
54. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th
Cir. 1999).
55. United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Service, 314 F.3d
995, 1002 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st
Cir.1995)).
56. See United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., Inc., 575 F.3d
458, 467 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he statute attaches liability, not to the underlying
fraudulent activity or to the Government’s wrongful payment, but to the claim for
payment.” (quoting Harrison, 176 F.3d at 785)).
57. Aflatooni, 314 F.3d at 1002.
58. Id. at 1002–03 (affirming summary judgment for the defendant where
the relator’s “evidence totally fail[ed] to describe in any detail any actual false
claims”); see also United States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare Inc., 382 F.3d 432, 440
(3d Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant where the relator
“did not come forward with a single claim that [the defendant] actually
submitted”); United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d
853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment for the defendants because
the FCA “specifically requires a claimant to point to a specific claim”). Though
necessary at the summary judgment stage, the identification of specific claims
prior to discovery is not always required. See United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T,
Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (joining six sister circuits in finding
specific claims need not be identified in the complaint); see also United States ex
rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 308 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting
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the statistical sampling context is whether the attachment of
liability to “a false or fraudulent claim” 59 requires identification of
which false or fraudulent claim. This issue will be addressed
infra.60
2. The Falsity Element
The FCA does not expressly define falsity, so the common law
definition of fraud controls this element.61 At common law, fraud
includes “misrepresentation[s] of fact . . . for the purpose of
inducing another to act.”62 The Restatement defines
misrepresentation as words or conduct “that amount[] to an
assertion not in accordance with the truth.”63
FCA falsity encompasses demands for payment from the
government where it should not pay anything, or wrongful
statements that one owes less money to the government than is
actually the case.64 A false claim seeks payment for “money the
a distinction between the requirement that the government or relators be able to
point to individual claims at the summary judgment stage from Rule 99B
requirements at the motion to dismiss stage); but see Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C.,
655 F.3d 461, 472 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding a “strict requirement that relators
identify actual false claims” in a complaint); Hopper v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint
that was unable to point to “the existence of a single actual false claim”).
59. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
60. Infra at IV.B. Statutory Analysis
61. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136
S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016) (noting that under the FCA, “the term ‘fraudulent’ is a
paradigmatic example of a statutory term that incorporates the common-law
meaning of fraud”).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
63. Id.
64. See Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998)
(“[O]nly those actions . . . which have the purpose and effect of causing the United
States to pay out money it is not obligated to pay, or those actions which
intentionally deprive the United States of money it is lawfully due, are properly
considered “claims” within the meaning of the FCA.”); United States ex rel. Shupe
v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 759 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[C]ourts have limited the
FCA’s application to ‘instances of fraud that might result in financial loss to the
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government otherwise would not have paid” were the claim not
false.65 Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that the FCA also
includes liability for misrepresentation by omission.66 Under this
implied false certification theory, a claim is false when it fails to
acknowledge “violations of statutory, regulatory, or contractual
requirements” if those violations are material to the government’s
payment decision.67
The FCA also requires objective falsity.68 Mere “differences of
interpretation” are not false under the FCA.69 Thus, a
disagreement in contractual or legal interpretation does not
constitute falsity under the FCA.70
Falsity must be proven with respect to the actual claim—the
mere implication of taint does not create a presumption of falsity
when falsity cannot be connected to the claim.71 Instead, falsity is
Government.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Sanders v. American-Amicable Life
Ins. Co. of Texas, 545 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2008))).
65. Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001)), abrogated on other grounds by
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989
(2016).
66. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995 (approving the implied “false
certification” theory of FCA liability).
67. Id. at 1999–2001.
68. See United States ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. General Dynamics, 652 F.3d
818, 836 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A statement may be deemed false for purposes of the
False Claims Act only if the statement represents an objective falsehood.”
(internal quotes omitted)); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root,
Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376–77 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he statement or conduct alleged
must represent an objective falsehood.”); United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 153 F.
Supp. 3d 1372 (N.D. Ala. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-13004 (11th Cir. May 27,
2016) (same).
69. United States ex rel. Lamers v. Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir.
1999); see also AseraCare, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1383 (“[E]xpressions of opinion or
scientific judgments about which reasonable minds may differ cannot be false.”
(internal quotes omitted) (citing United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004))).
70. See Yannacopoulos, 652 F.3d at 836–37 (discussing limitations on the
definition of falsity under the FCA).
71. See Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States, 728 F.3d 1348,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rejecting the government’s theory of a presumption of
falsity in a kickback case where it did not show that individual invoices were
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intrinsically tied to the claim itself.72 The statute ties falsity to the
claim by creating liability for “a false or fraudulent claim,”73 not
claims that are submitted “while fraud is afoot.”74 This is not to say
that falsity must lie within the four corners of an actual form
submitted to the government,75 but the claim must ask for money
which the government does not owe.76 In a fraud-in-theinducement case, for example, falsity for all claims derives from
the original fraudulent inducement.77 Fraudulent inducement
creates FCA liability for payments made under a contract which
was “procured by fraud.”78 But each claim is still false under the
FCA because the claim demands a payment different from what
the government actually owes.79 Thus if the government does not
false).
72. See id. (rejecting the argument that claims for payment on a subcontract
“were false or fraudulent because the subcontract itself was tainted by kickbacks”
but distinguishing the case at hand from fraud-in-the-inducement cases).
73. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012).
74. United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498
F. Supp. 2d 25, 67 (D.D.C. 2007).
75. See Imperial Meat Co. v. United States, 316 F.2d 435, 439–40 (10th Cir.
1963) (finding that although the actual invoice requesting payments did not
contain false information, reference to the whole body of contractual documents
made clear that there was a “false claim for payment for what had not been
delivered”).
76. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (defining falsity).
77. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 787–
88 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding FCA liability under a fraud-in-the-inducement theory
“because of the fraud surrounding the efforts to obtain the contract or benefit
status, or the payments thereunder” rather than falsity found in any given invoice
requesting for payment).
78. United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techns., Inc., 575 F.3d
458, 467–68 (5th Cir. 2009).
79. Id. One court reasoned that an “original misrepresentation taint[s]
every subsequent claim made in relation to the contract.” United States ex rel.
Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., 59 F.3d 196, 199 (D.D.C. 1995) (citing
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 543 (1943)); see also Harrison,
176 F.3d at 787–88 (deciding that in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess and
similar cases “liability attached . . . because of the fraud surrounding the efforts
to obtain the contract or benefit status, or the payments thereunder”). These cases
do not appear to rely on, or even analyze, the FCA’s coverage of “false or
fraudulent claim[s] for . . . approval” of the contract as a possible alternative
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show that a particular claim asks for the wrong amount in
payment, it has not established falsity for that claim.80 The issue
with this element then is whether statistical sampling can
adequately connect falsity to a claim outside the statistical sample.
3. The Knowledge Element
Knowledge under the FCA includes actual knowledge,
deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard81 that a submitted
claim is false.82 Specific intent is not required to establish FCA
theory of liability to a theory stretching “claim[s] for payment” to include invoices
that are not falsely inaccurate in fraud-in-the-inducement scenarios. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
80. Cf. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States, 728 F.3d 1348,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (reasoning that the government did not show “that the
invoices themselves were false or fraudulent” and agreeing with the district court
that “[n]o presumption applies to the FCA that would relieve defendant of its
burden to plead facts supporting the elements of an FCA claim”); United States
ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 57 (D.D.C.
2007) (“[R]elator ‘bears the burden of establishing that the claim or statement
submitted to the government was false.’”); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012)
(creating liability for anyone presenting “a false or fraudulent claim”); United
States ex rel. Morton v. A Plus Benefits, Inc., 139 Fed. Appx. 980, 982 (10th Cir.
2005) (“[I]f the factual allegations do not support a conclusion that a ‘false or
fraudulent claim’ was made, the case may not proceed under the FCA.”); United
States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Service, 314 F.3d 995, 1002 (9th Cir.
2002) (listing the essential FCA elements as requiring “a claim against the United
States . . . that was false or fraudulent”); but see United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d
449, 453 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that the trial judge need not examine each claim
because “[s]tatistical analysis should suffice”). However, every single claim in this
Seventh Circuit case had already been proven false. See United States ex rel.
Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Center, Inc., 764 F.3d 699, 714 (7th Cir.
2014) (“[E]ach and every form filed by the defendant was false.”). Although the
Absher panel found that Rogan permitted statistical evidence to determine “how
many of [the defendant’s] documents contained false certifications,” it also
acknowledged that “the relators’ difficulty in coming forward with evidence”
cannot shift the relators’ burden under the FCA. Id.
81. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A) (2012) (defining “knowing” and
“knowingly”).
82. See United States ex rel. Ubl v. IIF Data Solutions Eyeglasses, 650 F.3d
445, 452 (4th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant may be held liable under the FCA for
‘knowingly’ making or presenting a false claim.”); United States ex rel. Kreindler
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liability,83 but mere negligence or honest mistakes fall outside the
statute’s scope.84 The knowledge requirement applies at the time a
claim is submitted.85 It must be proven as to a particular
individual,86 but that “need not be the same individual who
submits” the claim.87 Furthermore, just as with the falsity element,
objectively reasonable interpretations of ambiguous contractual
and legal provisions will not constitute knowledge under the
FCA.88 The issue with statistical sampling and this element is
whether sampling can prove that a defendant knew that a
particular claim outside the sample was false where that claim is
not identified at trial.
4. The Materiality Element
The FCA defines “material” as “having a natural tendency to
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of
& Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1156 (2d Cir. 1993) (agreeing
that “the statutory basis for an FCA claim is the defendant’s knowledge of the
falsity of its claim”).
83. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring “no proof of specific intent
to defraud”).
84. See Untied States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 840 F.3d 494 (8th
Cir. 2016) (discussing the knowledge requirement).
85. See United States ex rel. Hefner v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 495 F.3d
103, 109 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming a grant of summary judgment, and reasoning
that an “after-the-fact interpretation of the situation [by a supervisor] does not
establish that the individuals submitting the claims knew that they were
submitting false claims”).
86. United States v. Fadul, NO. DKC 11–0885, 2013 WL 781614, at *9 (D.
Md. Feb. 28, 2013) (requiring proof that “a particular employee or officer acted
knowingly” (citing United States v. Science Applications Inter. Corp., 626 F.3d
1257, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2010))).
87. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah
River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 919 (4th Cir. 2003)).
88. See United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 807 F.3d 281, 290 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (“[T]he court’s focus is on the objective reasonableness of the
defendant's interpretation of an ambiguous term and whether there is any
evidence that the agency warned the defendant away from that interpretation.”
(citing Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 70 nn.19–20 (2007))).
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money or property.”89 Materiality is a “demanding” standard that
prevents the FCA from being used to litigate “garden-variety
breaches of contract or regulatory violations.”90 Materiality turns
on the “likely or actual behavior” of the government after
discovering the false statements.91 This element can be satisfied by
proving a defendant’s awareness of the government’s tendency to
not pay a claim which is “based on noncompliance with the
particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement.”92
Evidence that the government pays a claim despite knowing the
claimant violated the governing provisions or regulations could be
evidence that those provisions or regulations are not material.93
C. Previous Use of Statistical Sampling in FCA Cases
Courts have allowed statistical sampling for damages
calculations in a number of FCA cases.94 They “routinely endorse[]”
this method where documentation is not available to prove
damages, or where the government has already proven that every
claim is false.95 But the use of statistical sampling to prove
damages does not require an examination of whether statistical
sampling can establish the essential elements of FCA liability.96
Courts recognize at least three justifications for extrapolating
damages. First, examining each claim may be impractical when
89. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012).
90. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 2003 (2016).
91. Id. at 2002 (quoting 26 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 69:12 (4th ed. 2003)).
92. Id. at 2003.
93. See id. at 2003–04 (explaining materiality).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d
549, 560 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (noting past use of statistical sampling in FCA cases
for damages calculations only).
95. United States v. Fadul, No. DKC 11–0385, 2013 WL 781614, at *14 (D.
Md. Feb. 28, 2013) (permitting statistical sampling for damages calculations).
96. See Life Care, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (explaining the difference between
using statistical sampling in calculating damages and establishing liability).
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there are thousands of claims in question.97 For example, in one
recent case, the trial court allowed statistical sampling to show
both damages and liability where over 25,000 claims were at
issue.98 Second, the records and evidence needed to prove damages
may be missing or non-existent for some claims.99 In United States
v. Fadul,100 for example, the records for over 150 claims were
unobtainable.101 The court allowed statistical sampling to calculate
damages.102 Finally, statistical sampling appears in healthcare
overpayment cases outside the FCA context.103 The next subpart
considers this area in more detail.
D. Use of Statistical Sampling for Establishing Liability in NonFCA Contexts
Courts have allowed statistical sampling for proving liability
in at least two other areas of law: administrative overpayment
cases104 and in class action cases.105 This subpart addresses both
before turning to Supreme Court precedent limiting the use of
statistical evidence for proving liability.

97. See Fadul, 2013 WL 781614, at *14 (noting past endorsement of
statistical sampling in other contexts where “claim-by-claim review is not
practical”).
98. See United States v. Robinson, No. 13–cv–27–GFVT, 2015 WL 1479396,
at *10 (E.D. Ky. March 31, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-6353 (6th Cir. Sept. 1,
2016).
99. See Fadul, 2013 WL 781614, at *14 (permitting statistical sampling
because the necessary evidence was unobtainable).
100. No. DKC 11–0385, 2013 WL 781614 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2013).
101. See id. (permitting sampling for a damages calculation when the
necessary evidence was missing).
102. See id. (same).
103. See United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240–41 (D.P.R.
2000) (summarizing cases from several jurisdictions permitting statistical
sampling as evidence for damages calculations in the Medicare and Medicaid
contexts, then reasoning that such methods can carry over into FCA litigation).
104. Infra II.D.1. Administrative Overpayment Recovery
105. Infra II.D.2. Class Action
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1. Administrative Overpayment Recovery
Courts have permitted statistical sampling in the
administrative enforcement of healthcare regulations.106 In Chaves
County Home Health Services, Inc. v. Sullivan,107 the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that statistical
sampling was “the only feasible means” of recovering Medicare
overpayments.108 That methodology selected a random sample of
claims, audited them to determine the rate of overpayment, and
then extrapolated the audit to all claims within the suspect time
period.109 At the time, the relevant statute was silent on the
Secretary’s authority to employ statistical sampling, but the court
found it to be a permissible method of proving overpayment after
analysis under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC.110 The court
reasoned that because the statute gave the Secretary “general (and
uncontested) authority to recoup overpayments” and statistical
sampling was not “incompatible with either the statute or

106. See, e.g., Chaves Cty. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914,
923 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992) (permitting statistical
sampling for determining the number of overbilled Medicare claims); Ill.
Physicians Union v. Miller, 675 F.2d 151, 157 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding statistical
sampling in the administrative Medicaid context to be proper); State of Georgia
v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404, 409–10 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (determining that statistical
sampling was “not improper” for proving overpayments in an administrative
enforcement action); United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant
Life Care Centers of America, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 16,
United States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-251 (E.D. Tenn. Mar.
21, 2014), 2014 WL 5359287 (noting that “statistical extrapolation is routinely
used in the medical necessity context”).
107. 931 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
108. Id. at 922 (“[W]e cannot say that the Secretary’s interpretation of his
authority under the Act is unreasonable.”).
109. See id. (describing the methodology employed).
110. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (stating that judicial review of an agency’s
interpretation of ambiguous or silent terms of the statute it administers focuses
on whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of
the statute); see also Chaves Cty., 931 F.2d at 915 (finding that the agency could
interpret the statute it implemented to allow statistical sampling in the
administrative recovery context).
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Department regulations,” the Secretary’s interpretation was
entitled to deference.111
The major distinction between administrative recovery and
the FCA is that administrative recovery does not require analysis
of the same statutory elements as the FCA.112 Instead, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services wields broad discretion
to determine the amount of any overpayment.113 One avenue of
recovery is for States to recoup the overpayment by the method of
their choosing, while the federal government reduces the amount
it distributes to the State.114 Another is for entities participating
in the Medicare Integrity Program to repay the government
directly, using extrapolation in some circumstances.115
Furthermore, the Secretary’s determination that there is a high
rate of overpayments such that sampling is appropriate is
unreviewable.116 Notably, there is no requirement that the
Secretary identify wrongful claims for payment when evaluating
overpayments.117 These statutory features create a major
distinction between administrative recovery cases and FCA cases
because the two recovery regimes set forth a “distinctly different
standard” for liability.118
111. Id. at 917–22.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(d)(2)(A) (2012) (providing for the recovery of
overpayments in the federal healthcare system by reducing future disbursements
to States by the amount overpaid).
113. See id. (directing the Secretary to modify payments to States
administering federal medical programs for “any overpayment or underpayment
which the Secretary determines was made under this section”).
114. See id. § 1396b(d)(2)(C) (granting the States “1 year in which to recover
or attempt to recover such overpayment”).
115. See id. § 1395ddd(f)(3) (describing when the Secretary may permit
extrapolation).
116. See id. § 1395ddd(f)(3)(B) (“There shall be no administrative or judicial
review under section 1395ff of this title, section 1395oo of this title, or otherwise,
of determinations by the Secretary of sustained or high levels of payment errors
under this paragraph.”).
117. Id. §§ 1395gg(b), 1396b(d)(2)–(3).
118. See United States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549,
563 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (looking to administrative applications of sampling only “as
an example of how extrapolation can be used rather than a conclusive
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2. Class Action
Courts have also considered statistical sampling for proving
liability in the class action context. One notable instance where a
court allowed statistical sampling to prove liability was in Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos.119 That case arose under the Alien Tort Statute
and involved nearly 10,000 class members suing a foreign dictator
for human-rights abuses.120 The defendant’s estate noted that the
statistical sampling methodology that the plaintiffs advanced had
never before been used in the class action context and argued that
the methodology deprived the defendant of its due process
rights.121 The court, however, stated that “the time and judicial
resources required to try the nearly 10,000 claims” would be
“impossible.”122 Furthermore, it found no violation of procedural
due process after balancing the plaintiffs’ interest in recovery
against the defendant’s interest in avoiding an erroneous damages
calculation.123 The Fifth Circuit sought to distinguish Hilao two
years later, or, in the alternative, to simply disregard it as
incorrect.124 Furthermore, the Supreme Court “flatly rejected”
statistical sampling as employed in Hilao in a 2011 class action
case.125

determination of how statistical sampling should be used in FCA actions”).
119. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 784–87 (9th Cir. 1996)
(addressing a class action torts claim).
120. See id. at 771–72 (describing the background and jurisdiction of the
case).
121. See id. at 784–85 (noting the estate’s objection to statistical sampling).
122. Id. at 785.
123. See id. (finding no violation of procedural due process).
124. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“If Hilao is not thus distinguishable it is simply contrary to Fibreboard, which
binds us and which in our opinion is in any event correct.” (citing In re Fibreboard,
893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990))).
125. John M. Husband & Bradford J. Williams, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Redux:
The Future of the Sprawling Class Action, 40 COLO. LAW. 53, 59 (2011) (citing
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)).
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In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,126 the plaintiffs sought to
extrapolate back-pay eligibility from a sample of class members in
place of Title VII’s remedial procedures.127 Under Title VII,
employers have the opportunity to demonstrate that adverse
employment decisions were taken against employees for nondiscriminatory reasons, absolving them of liability for
discrimination claims.128 The plaintiffs proposed to determine the
percentage of back-pay claims from a statistical sample, apply that
percentage to the entire class, then multiply the extrapolated
number of claims by the average back-pay award to arrive at
damages.129 The Supreme Court “disapprove[d of] that novel
project.”130 It reasoned that Wal-Mart had the statutory right to
litigate each individual claim in the Title VII action, and the Rules
Enabling Act prohibited modifications of substantive rights.131
Five years later, the Court distinguished Dukes in Tyson
Foods.132 In that case, the class members sought to use statistical
sampling to establish the amount of time for which the plaintiffemployees were not paid in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.133 The Court concluded that “[w]hether a representative
sample may be used to establish classwide liability will depend on
the purpose for which the sample is being introduced and on the
underlying cause of action.”134 The Court reasoned that statistical
sampling was permissible in Tyson Foods because “each class
member could have relied on that sample to establish liability if he
126. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
127. See id. at 366–67 (discussing the plaintiffs’ proposed “Trial by
Formula”).
128. See id. (noting Title VII’s remedial procedures).
129. See id. (describing plaintiff’s statistical sampling scheme).
130. Id.
131. See id. (rejecting the proposed “Trial by Formula”).
132. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016).
133. See id. at 1046 (describing the plaintiffs’ argument that individual
determinations for each class member’s time spent donning and doffing protective
equipment was “unnecessary because it can be assumed each employee donned
and doffed for the same average time observed in [the statistical] sample”).
134. Id. at 1049 (emphasis added).
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or she had brought an individual action.”135 Statistical sampling
did not deprive Tyson Foods of its right to litigate individual claims
because it would have litigated the same defenses to the exact
same evidence in every individual case had the evidence not been
applied classwide.136 Thus the general acceptability of statistical
evidence to prove the violation of a particular statute is dependent
on the particular cause of action.
III. The Split on Statistical Sampling in the FCA Context
Divergent district court decisions have raised a question of law
that had not seriously entered the realm of FCA litigation until
2014.137 Some courts have allowed statistical sampling as a legally
viable mechanism for proving FCA liability 138 and some courts
have not.139 The only appellate court to rule on the issue so far
dispensed with the question on jurisdictional grounds.140 Thus, the
135. Id. at 1046; see also id. at 1048 (“[I]f the employees had brought 1 ½
million individual suits, there would be little or no role for representative
evidence.”).
136. See id. at 1047 (“[The defendant’s] defense is itself common to the claims
made by all class members.”).
137. See Robert T. Rhoad, Jason M. Crawford & Mary Kate Healy,
Extrapolation in FCA Litigation: A Statistical Anomaly or a Tactic Here To Stay?,
58 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 9 (Jan. 13, 2016) (noting Life Care’s introduction of the
statistical sampling and liability issue into FCA litigation).
138. See Life Care, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (permitting statistical sampling);
United States v. Americus Mortgage Corp., No. 4:12–CV–2676, 2017 WL 4083589,
at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2017) (same); United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa
Healthcare, LLC, No. 8:11–cv–1303–T–23TBM, 2015 WL 1926417 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
28, 2015) (same); United States v. Robinson, No. 13–cv–27–GFVT, 2015 WL
1479396, at *10 (E.D. Ky. March 31, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-6353 (6th Cir.
Sept. 1, 2016) (same); United States v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12–CV–245–KOB,
2014 WL 6879254, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 2014) (same), vacated and substituted,
No: 2:12-CV-245-KOB, 2014 WL 12593996 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 19, 2014).
139. See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12–
3466–JFA, 2015 WL 3903675, at *8 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (declining to permit
statistical sampling); United States v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., No. 3:07-cv00604-M, 2016 WL 3449833, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 20, 2016) (same).
140. See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 848 F.3d
330 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e are constrained to dismiss that aspect of the relators’
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legal sufficiency of statistical sampling will probably remain a live
issue in FCA litigation for the foreseeable future.141 This Part
discusses the primary cases on either side of the split and examines
the arguments for and against statistical sampling.
A. Cases Permitting Statistical Sampling
In Life Care, the government alleged that an elder care
provider overbilled Medicare for skilled nursing services.142 The
government paid Life Care prospectively under a statutory per
diem formula based on the number of hours of service and the
classification of the services rendered.143 The complaint alleged
that Life Care billed for medically unnecessary services, and that
the company pressured therapists to bill at the highest possible
rate.144 The relator specifically alleged that Life Care performed
unnecessary treatments, treated patients who should not have
been treated, improperly delivered group treatment to patients,
and billed Medicare for skilled services that did not require a
skilled specialist.145 The case involved over 150,000 total
submissions for payment.146 The government sought to extrapolate
the total number of false claims from a statistical sample of 400
patients.147 Life Care moved for partial summary judgment,
arguing that statistical sampling could not meet the government’s
burden of proof under the FCA.148 The court addressed the use of
appeal as improvidently granted.”).
141. See James Swann & Eric Topor, Outlook 2017: New Year May Bring
Stark Reform, ACA Repeal, Heavy Dose of Uncertainty, BNA’S HEALTH CARE
FRAUD REP. at 8–9 (Jan. 4, 2017) (predicting that district courts will continue to
rule differently on sampling).
142. See United States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549,
553 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (discussing the case’s background).
143. See id. at 552–53 (same).
144. See id. at 553–54 (summarizing the complaint).
145. See id. at 555 (same).
146. See id. at 556 (noting the size of the case).
147. See id. (explaining the government’s statistical sampling scheme).
148. See id. at 557 (discussing the parties’ arguments).
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statistical sampling in terms of each FCA liability element before
briefly addressing Life Care’s due process concerns.149
The Life Care court decided that the government did not have
to “specify with detail all of the individual claims” involved in the
lawsuit.150 Although the court recognized that the government
“could” litigate claim by claim and provide “individualized proof of
specific claims,” it reasoned that such an effort would take a long
time and would be “impractical.”151 Furthermore, the court
distinguished a case which Life Care relied upon,152 United States
v. Friedman.153 In Friedman, the court declined to extrapolate from
a statistical sample out of “reluctan[ce] to accept a statistical
sampling as the basis for doubling the alleged overpayment
without the same scrutiny and support” that the sample
underwent at trial.154 In declining to follow Friedman, the court
noted that individual review for each individual claim was viable
in Friedman due to the smaller number of claims.155 By contrast,
reviewing each of the 154,621 claims at issue in Life Care would
take up an “unacceptable” amount of the court’s time.156
Regarding the falsity element, the court rejected Life Care’s
argument that the individualized nature of medical diagnoses
required a patient-by-patient look at the details of each case to
determine whether any given patient’s treatment was medically
unnecessary.157 Although it recognized that some of the many
individual factors were determinative of the treatment chosen for
149. See id. at 565 (analyzing the defendant’s challenge to the proposed
statistical sampling scheme).
150. Id. at 565 (internal quotes omitted).
151. Id.
152. See id. (stating that the court was not compelled by defendant’s
argument that the government would be unable to identify individual false claims
upon request).
153. No. 86-0610-MA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496 (D. Mass. July 23, 1993).
154. Id. at *9 n.1.
155. See United States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549,
565 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (distinguishing Friedman).
156. Id.
157. See id. at 567 (declaring that the court was unpersuaded).
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a given patient, the court reasoned that statistical sampling has
been used “for decades,” and the methodology was not “unique” to
healthcare litigation.158 The court then cited a case permitting
statistical sampling to calculate damages in an administrative
proceeding where “sampling was the only feasible method of audit
available.”159 It further reasoned that Life Care could “employ
cross examination and competing witnesses” if it wanted to show
the differences between the claims.160
The court likewise rejected Life Care’s knowledge element
argument “that the Government will be completely unable to
establish that [the defendant] had knowledge of the alleged false
claims.”161 It reasoned that the argument attacked the evidence
proffered by the government for claims in the sample, not that
evidence’s extrapolation to the full universe of claims.162 Thus the
arguments did not, in the court’s eyes, adequately show why
statistical sampling would be insufficient for proving knowledge of
claims outside the sample.163
Finally, regarding the materiality element, the court again
found Life Care’s arguments unpersuasive.164 Life Care argued
that “the mathematical intricacies of the Medicare billing system”
made it impossible for statistical sampling to show which claims
“influence[d], or [were] capable of influencing” the government’s
payment decision.165 The court disagreed for three reasons.166
158. Id. at 566.
159. Id. (citing State of Georgia v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404, 409–10 (N.D.
Ga. 1977)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 568.
162. See id. (reasoning that the defendant’s argument was “inapposite to the
issue presently before the Court”).
163. See id. (finding that “summary judgment in favor of [the defendant]
would be unwarranted and without any support in the evidentiary record”).
164. See id. at 569 (finding that statistical sampling could be used to
establish the FCA’s materiality element).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 569–70 (listing the court’s reasons for ruling against the
defendant on this element).
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First, Sixth Circuit precedent focused on the “potential rather than
. . . actual effect” of a false statement on the government’s payment
decision, whereas Life Care argued that statistical sampling could
not prove actual effect.167 Second, the court thought that the
argument was speculative because “the Government’s
methodology will take into account overpayments that would not
be reimbursable.”168 Finally, the court considered materiality to be
a question of fact best left to the jury.169
After addressing each element that Life Care argued, the court
turned to its due process argument.170 Life Care argued that the
government’s failure to identify specific false claims would impair
its ability to defend against the lawsuit and that statistical
sampling amounts to a burden shift that forces the defense to put
forward evidence rebutting presumptions made by the
extrapolation methodology.171 The court disagreed for two
reasons.172 First, it stated that the Due Process Clause173 does not
entitle defendants to defend each individual claim under the
FCA.174 The court also stated that Life Care “will be afforded due
process by having the opportunity to depose the Government’s

167. Id.; but see Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,
136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) (“[M]ateriality look[s] to the effect on the likely or
actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.” (internal quotes
omitted)).
168. Id. at 570.
169. See id. (dismissing the defendant’s arguments); but see Universal Health
Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 n.6 (2016) (“We
reject Universal Health's assertion that materiality is too fact intensive for courts
to dismiss False Claims Act cases on a motion to dismiss or at summary
judgment.”).
170. See id. (examining the due process concerns with statistical sampling).
171. See id. (summarizing the defendant’s argument).
172. See id. (ruling against the defendant).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
174. See United States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549,
570 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (reasoning that the “low risk of error and the Government
interest in minimizing administrative burdens” balanced in favor of allowing
statistical sampling (quoting Yorktown Med. Lab., Inc. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 90
(2d Cir. 1991))).

TRIAL BY FORMULA

129

expert, challenge the qualifications of the Government’s expert,
retain its own expert, and to present all of this evidence at trial.”175
Based on all of the above analysis, the Life Care court
determined that statistical sampling was “a legally viable
mechanism” for proving liability under the FCA.176 The case
settled in 2016 for $145 million.177
Since the Life Care decision, several district courts have
approved the use of statistical sampling. Another district court in
the Sixth Circuit reached the same result as Life Care, but without
undertaking the same element-by-element analysis.178 In United
States v. Robinson,179 the government alleged that the defendant
submitted fraudulent claims to Medicare for medically
unnecessary services and services that were not actually
rendered.180 The case involved over 25,000 potentially false claims,
but the government sought to prove liability by using only thirty
of them.181 Without engaging in much substantive analysis, the
court approved of this methodology and denied summary
judgment.182 A number of recent cases likewise have allowed for
the use of statistical sampling without extensive analysis of the
statute itself.183
175. Id.
176. Id. at 571.
177. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Life Care Centers of America,
Inc. Agrees to Pay $145 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Relating
to the Provision of Medically Unnecessary Rehabilitation Therapy Services (Oct.
26, 2016) (announcing the settlement) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
178. See United States v. Robinson, No. 13–cv–27–GFVT, 2015 WL 1479396,
at *10 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-6353 (6th Cir. Sept. 1,
2016).
179. Id.
180. See id. at *3 (noting the government’s allegations).
181. See id. at *10 (discussing the use of statistical sampling in the case)
182. See id. at *11 (relying primarily on Sixth Circuit precedent).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Americus Mortgage Corp., No. 4:12–CV–2676,
2017 WL 4083589, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2017) (allowing statistical sampling);
United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, No. 8:11–cv–1303–T–
23TBM, 2015 WL 1926417 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2015) (same); United States v.
AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12–CV–245–KOB, 2014 WL 6879254, at *10 (N.D. Ala.
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B. Cases Not Permitting Statistical Sampling
Recent cases have denied the use of statistical sampling for
establishing FCA liability. These opinions do not engage in the
element-by-element analysis implemented in Life Care,184 but
instead look to broader precedent.185
1. United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Community,
Inc.186
Agape involved nursing home services reimbursed through
federal Medicare, Medicaid, and Tricare programs.187 The relator
alleged that between 50,000 and 60,000 reimbursement claims
were fraudulent.188 The relator estimated that without statistical
sampling, its hired experts would spend between four and nine
hours reviewing each patient’s files, costing somewhere between
$16,200,000 and $36,500,000.189 The relator sought to use
statistical sampling, but the court ruled that the relator must
“prove each and every claim based upon the evidence relating to
that particular claim.”190

Dec. 4, 2014) (same), vacated and substituted, No: 2:12-CV-245-KOB, 2014 WL
12593996 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 19, 2014) (same).
184. See United States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549,
565 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (responding to Life Care’s arguments that the government
would be “unable to establish each element through statistical sampling”).
185. See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12–
3466–JFA, 2015 WL 3903675, at *8 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (relying primarily on
broader cases when declining to permit statistical sampling); United States v.
Vista Hospice Care, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00604-M, 2016 WL 3449833, at *13 (N.D.
Tex. Jun. 20, 2016) (same).
186. No. 0:12–3466–JFA, 2015 WL 3903675 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015).
187. Id. at *1 (discussing the case’s background).
188. See id (same).
189. See id. (same).
190. Id. at *6.
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The court’s reasoning primarily rests on case precedent rather
than, as in Life Care, an examination of the elements.191 The court
distinguished cases where statistical sampling was the only way to
put on evidence because individualized evidence was missing or
destroyed.192 Every patient’s chart here was “intact and available
for review by either party.”193 The court then listed the “legion” of
cases on both sides of the issue before determining that “the fairest
course of action based upon the facts presented and the claims
asserted in this case” was to reject the use of statistical
sampling.194 One of the cited cases, United States ex rel. Hockett v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation,195 discusses D.C. Circuit
precedent on statistical sampling in United States v. Krizek.196 The
Columbia court noted that previous cases permitted statistical
sampling in FCA cases only where “some degree of liability is
conceded” and the parties consent.197 The Columbia court did not
allow statistical sampling in the end because the defendant did not
concede liability and did not consent to the use of statistical
sampling.198 Similarly, the defendant in Agape did not consent to
statistical sampling and liability was contested.199

191. See id. (explaining the court’s rationale).
192. See id. (distinguishing cases where claim-by-claim evidence is
impossible from where it is impractical).
193. Id. at *7.
194. Id. at *7–*8.
195. 498 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2007).
196. See id. at 66 (“Krizek thus permits that where some degree of liability is
conceded, slight deviations from traditional modes of proof are tolerable . . . .”)
(citing 192 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
197. Id. at 67.
198. See id. (distinguishing from precedent).
199. See Memorandum in Opposition to Relators’ Motion to Permit Statistical
Sampling Evidence at 16, United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty.,
Inc., No. 0:12–3466–JFA, 2015 WL 3903675 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (“Agape does
not consent to any statistical sampling method proposed by Relators—for the
simple reason that sampling is not a legitimate means for proving the elements
of a False Claims Act claim generally and it is particularly inappropriate given
the specific facts of this case.”).
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The Agape court ultimately decided that the determination “of
whether certain services furnished to nursing home patients were
medically necessary” was a “highly fact-intensive inquiry” that did
not lend itself to the use of statistical sampling.200 The court did
not reach the defendant’s constitutional arguments and observed
that the defendants would likely examine every claim in detail in
their case-in-chief, meaning “that the statistical sampling would
not significantly shorten the trial.”201
The Fourth Circuit dismissed the statistical sampling appeal
on jurisdictional grounds.202 It reasoned that the district court
ruled on the use of statistical sampling based on “the particular
facts and evidence in this case.”203 Furthermore, the relator argued
that the district court’s ruling was an evidentiary determination,
not one of pure law.204 Thus the Fourth Circuit saw the question
before it as one turning in part on questions of fact.205 This ruling
demonstrates how it is important for advocates before a district
court to clearly denote whether they are arguing about the
admissibility of an expert witness’s statistical sampling
methodology or about the legal sufficiency of statistical sampling
for establishing the essential elements of a FCA cause of action.

200. See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12–
3466–JFA, 2015 WL 3903675, at *8 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (ruling against the use
of statistical sampling).
201. Id. at *8 n.4.
202. See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 848 F.3d
330, 340 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e find it prudent to re-examine whether that aspect
of the relator’s appeal is appropriate for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b).”).
203. Id. at 26.
204. See id. (citing to the relator’s brief).
205. See id. at 25 (“[Section] 1292(b) review is not appropriate where, for
example, the question presented ‘turns on whether there is a genuine issue of fact
or whether the district court properly applied settled law to the facts or evidence
of a particular case.’” (citation omitted)).
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2. United States v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc.206
Another district court in Texas recently declined to allow
statistical sampling.207 The defendant in this case was a hospice
provider, and the relator was one of its employees.208 The relator
alleged, among other things, that the defendant improperly
certified Medicare patients for hospice eligibility.209 The relator
sought to use a statistical sample of 291 patients to examine and
extrapolate a percentage of false claims submitted for services
rendered to roughly 12,000 patients.210
The Vista court ruled against statistical sampling both
because the particular methodology proposed was unreliable211
and because it found that statistical sampling could not establish
the essential FCA elements for the claims outside the statistical
sample.212 It disagreed with “the proposition that sampling and
extrapolation are always reliable, regardless of the nature of the
data and the nature of the claim.”213 The Vista court recognized
that Supreme Court precedent directed it to determine whether
statistical sampling could “reliably prove the elements of the
specific claim.”214 Considering the subjectivity in a doctor’s decision
to certify a patient as hospice eligible, the court determined that
“proof regarding one claim does not meet [the r]elator’s burden of
proof regarding other claims involving different patients, different
medical conditions, different caregivers, different facilities,

206. No. 3:07-cv-00604-M, 2016 WL 3449833 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 20, 2016).
207. Id. at *13.
208. See id. at *1 (detailing the case’s background).
209. See id. (same).
210. See id. at *10 (same).
211. See id. at *11 (noting that “the underlying determination of eligibility
for hospice is inherently subjective, patient-specific, and dependent on the
judgment of involved physicians”).
212. See id. at *13 (recognizing that claims outside the sample were very
factually diverse).
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011)).
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different time periods, and different physicians.”215 The court
additionally noted that the relator made the choice to pursue a
large FCA action including many individual allegedly false claims
“of which she did not have personal knowledge.”216 The relator’s
decision to pursue a massive lawsuit could not reduce her statutory
burden of proof.217
IV. The Legal Sufficiency of Statistical Sampling for Proving FCA
Liability
The cases discussed above introduce the ultimate question of
this Note: Whether statistical sampling is appropriate for
establishing liability under the FCA. First, this Part determines
how to analyze the sampling question. It then proceeds with an
analysis of the relationship between sampling and the FCA’s
liability requirements before addressing the burden shifting and
due process implications of statistical sampling.
A. Precedent for Statistical Sampling
The FCA is silent on whether statistical sampling can
establish the essential elements of a FCA claim.218 As mentioned
supra,219 the Supreme Court disapproved of statistical sampling
and extrapolation in Dukes.220 Rather than prohibiting statistical
215. Id. at *13.
216. Id.
217. See id. (“These choices, made by Relator, do not reduce her burden to
produce reliable evidence of liability.”).
218. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729–33 (2012) (stating nothing with regards to
statistical sampling); see also United States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 3d 549, 571 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (noting that there is no explicit prohibition
concerning extrapolation in the text of the FCA).
219. See supra notes 126–131 and accompanying text (discussing Dukes).
220. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (declining
to allow a classwide injury to be proven with statistical sampling in a Title VII
case). The Court’s reasoning behind its disapproval was that the Rules Enabling
Act forbade the modification of substantive rights via interpreting Rule 23(b). See
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sampling outright, the Court clarified its stance on the issue in
Tyson Foods by finding that sampling’s permissibility depends “not
on the form a proceeding takes . . . but on the degree to which the
evidence is reliable in proving or disproving the elements of the
relevant cause of action.”221 Thus examining the FCA itself is
necessary to determine whether statistical sampling is appropriate
in this context.222
B. Statutory Analysis
The ultimate question posed by statistical sampling is
whether the government must identify which specific claim is the
false claim resulting in liability, or whether it must only establish
that a defendant submitted a certain number of claims. For the
reasons below, the FCA requires identification of each false claim
to establish liability for that claim.
Because the statute attaches liability to each individual claim,
the FCA requires individual proof for each false claim. The FCA
creates liability where a person knowingly submits “a false or
fraudulent claim,” and allows the recovery of damages for “the act
of that person.”223 The use of singular words here shows that the
source of FCA liability is the individual claim. This reading is
consistent with the Dictionary Act, which states that singular
terms can also apply to the plural of that term “unless the context
indicates otherwise.”224 That context is the text of the rest of the

id. (reversing the Ninth Circuit). The Court saw statistical sampling used to
establish a classwide injury as depriving the defendant of its right to “litigate its
statutory defenses to individual claims.” Id.
221. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (emphasis
added).
222. See id. (“Whether a representative sample may be used to establish
class-wide liability will depend on the purpose for which the sample is being
introduced and on the elements of the underlying cause of action.” (internal
quotes omitted)).
223. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
224. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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FCA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.225 The Supreme Court
has held that the penalty applies once for each act a defendant
takes that fulfills all elements of FCA liability.226 Its prior
interpretation of Section 3729 as attaching a civil penalty to each
individual false claim, instead of imposing one penalty for all of a
defendant’s conduct when submitting false claims, shows that the
FCA attaches liability to each individual false claim.227 Because
each penalty attaches to an individual false claim, it would be
inconsistent to read “a civil penalty” in Section 3729 as singular
without also reading “a false or fraudulent claim” as also
singular.228 Under this reading, each false claim constitutes a
separate, individual violation of the FCA for which the government
must individually “prove all essential elements.”229
Furthermore, the text requires the government to “prove all
essential elements of the cause of action,” rather than requiring
proof of the essential elements for each false claim.230 The
dictionary definition of “cause of action” ties the term to “[t]he fact
or facts which give a person a right to judicial relief” and the “legal
effect of an occurrence in terms of redress.”231 The knowing
submission of each false claim is the occurrence that creates the
government’s right to pursue relief under the FCA.232 “Cause of
action” as it is used in the FCA, then, refers the right of recovery
stemming from the submission of the false claim, with each false
225. See Coleman v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461,
473 (7th Cir. 2017) (interpreting the Magistrate Judges Act).
226. See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 312–13 (1976) (assigning
one civil penalty to a subcontractor for each individual action it knew would result
in the submission of a false claim).
227. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 768 (2000) (“The defendant is liable for . . . a civil penalty of up to $10,000
per claim.”) (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986) (stating that a
penalty applies once for “each false claim submitted”).
228. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
229. Id. § 3731(d).
230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. Cause of Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
232. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012).
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claim giving rise to its own right of recovery if examined
individually.
For the same reason that there can be no FCA liability for one
claim without establishing every element for that one claim, there
can be no FCA liability for any other false claim without
individually proving each element for that claim. Specific proof “in
at least one instance”233 establishes liability for at least one false
claim,234 not every possible false claim. Because the Act “requires
a claimant to point to a specific claim,” summary judgment for the
defendant is proper where the government “can never point to a
specific” false claim.235 Thus when the court evaluates the legal
sufficiency of the government’s proof, the FCA requires
individualized proof of at least one claim.236 To apply the FCA
consistently, the individual examination necessary to prove one
claim should be required for each claim because each claim is an

233. United States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare, Inc., 382 F.3d 432, 440 (3d Cir.
2004) (agreeing with the defendant’s argument).
234. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012) (holding liable anyone who
“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval”).
235. United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d 853,
858 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group,
Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 308 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]o recover under the FCA, we have
recognized that ultimately a plaintiff must come forward with at least a ‘single
false [or fraudulent] claim . . . .” (quoting United States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare
Inc., 382 F.3d 432, 440 (3d Cir. 2004))). It is true that the government is not
required “to identify every false claim submitted for payment” at the pleading
stage. Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 470 (6th Cir. 2011). However,
pleading requirements are quite different from liability requirements. See
Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 308 (“It is axiomatic that the standards for dismissing claims
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and granting judgment under . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
are vastly different.” (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d
Cir. 2009))).
236. See United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d
853, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that the relator “did not meet her burden”
after failing to identify a second claim for payment when alleging a double billing
scheme (citing United States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare, Inc., 382 F.3d 432 (3d
Cir. 2004); United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995
(9th Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d
1301 (11th Cir. 2002))).
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independent source of liability. Thus the FCA requires
individualized proof for each individual false claim.
The purpose and actual effect of statistical sampling is to avoid
an individual examination of each claim in a large universe of
claims.237 Without this individual examination, it is impossible to
show which claim is allegedly false, or which claim an individual
allegedly knows is false. Because the FCA requires an
individualized examination of each false claim, the FCA’s liability
requirements “cannot be replaced [with a] ‘Trial by Formula.’”238
Therefore, statistical sampling cannot establish liability under the
FCA.
C. Burden Shift
Statistical sampling may also amount to an improper burden
shift under the FCA. As sampling does not differentiate the claim
that it has proven false from the claim that it has not, it requires
a defendant to examine every claim in its case in chief in order to
identify and defend the specific claims that sampling predicts
would be false. This effectively places the burden on the defendant,
which would conflict with the FCA’s plain text.239
One commentator has posited that allowing statistical
sampling in Life Care was “the right doctrinal result”240 in light of
237. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBURG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:21 (5th
ed. 2013) (recognizing that of all the possible claims in a lawsuit, “only a subset
can ever be actually tried” if sampling is employed); United States v. Life Care
Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549, 566 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (stating that the
purpose of sampling is “that a smaller portion of claims will be used to draw an
inference about a larger, not entirely identical, population of claims”).
238. United States v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00604-M, 2016
WL 3449833, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 20, 2016) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011)).
239. See 31 U.S.C. § 3731(d) (2012) (“In any action brought under section
3730, the United States shall be required to prove all essential elements of the
cause of action . . . .” (emphasis added)).
240. Case Comment, False Claims Act—Proof of Liability—Eastern District
of Tennessee Rules that Statistical Extrapolation May Suffice to Prove Liability.—
United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., Nos. 1:08-CV-
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the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc.241 Where a defendant destroys evidence and makes it
impossible to prove the existence of a false claim, perhaps imposing
a burden shift is right for the calculation of damages.242 But that
is only because a “reasonable estimate of the cause of injury, and
of its amount” may be the only way for the government to prove its
allegations if a defendant’s “misconduct has rendered [the
necessary evidence] unavailable.”243 Bigelow calls for a
presumption against wrongdoers who destroy or lose evidence,244
which is not the same as situations, like in Agape, where the
evidence is available for examination.245 There is no precedent in
the FCA context directing a burden shift to the defendant absent
the destruction of evidence.246 In fact, one circuit has found the
exact opposite: “A defendant’s wrongdoing does not shift the
burden of proof to the defendant under the FCA.”247 Bigelow
therefore does not permit a burden shift where proving the
251, 1:12-CV-64, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142660 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014), 128
HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2080 (2015)
241. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946)
(recognizing that the “wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his
own wrong has created.”).
242. See id. at 265–66 (“The constant tendency of the courts is to find some
way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been done. Difficulty
of ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery for a proven invasion
of the plaintiff's rights.” (internal quotes omitted)).
243. Id. at 265.
244. See id. (discussing a presumption shift in cases where the “wrongdoer's
misconduct has rendered unavailable” the necessary evidence).
245. See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12–
3466–JFA, 2015 WL 3903675, at *7 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (recalling a separate
case that court previously handled “where statistical sampling represented the
only way the plaintiff-relators could prove damages” because the evidence had
“been destroyed or dissipated”).
246. See United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d
853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006) (“At worst, [the defendant] was a criminal enterprise that
kept poor records. There is simply no legal authority under the FCA for the
proposition that [the relator]’s burden of proof must then be shifted to [the
defendant] as a result.”)
247. United States ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc.,
764 F.3d 699, 714 (7th Cir. 2014).
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government’s allegations is merely difficult, expensive, or
inconvenient.248 Though the cost of litigating each claim for which
the government seeks to prove liability can seem burdensome, it is
worth remembering that a losing defendant bears the costs of that
litigation.249
D. Due Process
Finally, the use of statistical sampling for proving liability
raises due process concerns. Due process challenges to statistical
sampling appear frequently but unsuccessfully in medical
overpayment cases.250 As one commentator has recently addressed
the due process concerns with sampling in FCA cases in more
detail,251 the issue will only be considered briefly here. The concern
is that statistical sampling in effect prevents the defendant from
presenting “a factual defense to any of the essential elements of
FCA liability” for any claims outside the statistical sample.252
248. See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No. 0:12–
3466–JFA, 2015 WL 3903675, at *7 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (distinguishing
precedent by observing that in the instant case, “nothing has been destroyed or
dissipated”).
249. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (2012) (“A person violating this subsection
shall also be liable to the United States Government for the costs of a civil action
brought to recover any such penalty or damages.”).
250. See United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Life Care
Centers of America, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 23, United
States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-251 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 2014),
2014 WL 5359287 (“Courts have consistently rejected the very same due process
argument that Life Care makes here.” (citing Yorktown Med. Lab., Inc. v. Perales,
948 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1021
(5th Cir. 1997); Ill. Physicians Union v. Miller, 675 F.2d 151, 157 (7th Cir. 1982);
Ratanesen v. Cal., Dep’t of Health Servs., 11 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993);
Chaves County Home Health Serv. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 919 (D.C. Cir.
1991))).
251. See generally Christina Vlahos, When the Ends Do Not Justify the Means:
The Application of Statistical Sampling to Determine Liability in False Claims
Act Cases, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 813 (2016) (examining the due process concerns
with employing statistical sampling in FCA litigation).
252. Life Care’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment As to the Government’s “Unidentified Claims” at 22, United States v.
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Forcing defendants to litigate all claims outside the sample
without any indication as to which specific claims are supposedly
false may deprive defendants of the opportunity to effectively
defend against the government’s allegations.253
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the deprivation “of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”254 Mathews v.
Eldridge255 governs the procedural due process concerns raised
here.256 This test balances “(1) the private interest affected; (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the
government interest.”257
The defendant’s private interest here is the “due process right
to raise individual challenges and defenses to claims,”258 analogous
to the class action context. In Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,259 the court
noted that defendant’s due process right to provide defenses for
each of the elements of a particular plaintiff’s claim and analogized
this to a due process right to defend against class membership.260
The particular interest at stake in an FCA case would be the right
to provide a defense to each time that the defendant allegedly
“knowingly present[ed], or cause[d] to be presented, a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”261
Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-251 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2014), 2014 WL
12628637.
253. See id. at 23 (“[Statistical sampling] leaves Life Care to defend against
unknown claims, relating to unknown patients, for unknown therapy services, on
unknown dates – and to face quasi-criminal, treble damages and civil penalties
for each such unknown claim.”).
254. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
255. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
256. See Yorktown Med. Lab., Inc. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 90 n.7 (2d Cir.
1991) (applying Mathews to an administrative overpayment case involving
statistical sampling).
257. Id.
258. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d. Cir. 2013).
259. Id.
260. See id. at 307 (“A defendant has a similar, if not the same, due process
right to challenge the proof used to demonstrate class membership as it does to
challenge the elements of a plaintiff's claim.”).
261. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012).
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Courts have grounded their analysis of the risk of erroneously
impinging upon a defendant’s private interests on the
understanding that statistical sampling carries “low risk of
error.”262 This factor therefore depends on the scientific reliability
of the particular statistical methodology employed in that case.263
To the degree that the due process clause is concerned with
depriving defendants of a right using problematic proof,264 the
weight of this factor may vary case-to-case.
Courts have also weighed “the government interest in
minimizing administrative burdens” heavily in this context.265 The
consideration here is whether sampling may be “the only feasible
method” by which the government can combat large-scale fraud.266
But where “an explicit provision in the statute . . . requires
individualized claims adjudications,” the government’s interest in
easing the burdens of proving its case may not so easily outweigh
the due process rights at stake.267 Along these lines, the FCA’s
individual liability requirements268 distinguishes FCA cases from
the administrative enforcement cases that have considered the due
process question in the past.269
262. Yorktown, 948 F.2d at 90; see also Chaves Cty. Home Health Serv., Inc.
v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[I]n light of the fairly low risk of
error so long as the extrapolation is made from a representative sample and is
statistically significant, the government interest predominates.”).
263. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Loughren v. UnumProvident Corp., 604 F.
Supp. 2d 259, 269 (D. Mass. 2009) (excluding a statistical sampling methodology
that had not been shown to be generally accepted by the scientific community and
that was “susceptible to manipulation and significant error”).
264. See Neil Issar, More Data Mining for Medical Misrepresentation?
Admissibility of Statistical Proof Derived from Predictive Methods of Detecting
Medical Reimbursement Fraud, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 341, 360–73 (2015) (discussing
the evidentiary issues associated with statistical sampling).
265. Chaves, 931 F.2d at 922; see also Ill. Physicians Union v. Miller, 675
F.2d 151, 157 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that “balance is heavily weighed in favor of”
the government in an administrative enforcement case).
266. State of Georgia v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404, 410 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
267. Chaves Cty., 931 F.2d at 922.
268. See supra IV.B. Statutory Analysis (discussing the FCA’s requirement
that the government individually prove each claim).
269. See supra notes 112–118 and accompanying text (distinguishing
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On balance, statistical sampling may violate a FCA
defendant’s due process rights. The right to defend against each
individual alleged violation of a statute merits more weight than
the right to possess money when balanced against sampling’s
reliability in a due process analysis.270 It becomes burdensome for
a defendant to put on the best possible defense for the individual
claims alleged to be false when it does not know for which claims
it would be held liable.271 Thus, even where a statistical sampling
methodology is scientifically reliable, a defendant may have no
choice but to put on evidence regarding each claim outside the
statistical sample to address all the claims for which it could be
liable. 272 Although the effort necessary for the government to put
on individualized evidence for each claim is great, the size of a
particular suit should not affect how a court evaluates a
constitutional right.273 Effectively necessitating that a defendant
administrative enforcement cases from FCA cases based on the statutory
elements implicated in each). Thus the Life Care court’s reliance on an
administrative enforcement case in its procedural due process analysis should be
revisited. See United States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549,
570 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (“Specifically, courts that have considered the issue of
statistical extrapolation to calculate overpayment have found that it is an
acceptable practice which does not violate a defendant’s due process rights.”
(citing Yorktown Med. Lab., Inc. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir.1991))).
270. See Chaves Cty. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 922
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that statutory language requiring an individualized
analysis may lead to a different due process analysis than in the administrative
recovery context).
271. See Life Care’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as to the Government’s “Unidentified Claims” at 22, United
States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-251 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2014),
2014 WL 12628637 (noting that statistical sampling “fails to apprise [defendants]
of the specific claims and statements the Government contends constitute
violations of the FCA, and thus precludes [defendants] from investigating,
developing and presenting factual and expert evidence related defenses to each of
the essential FCA elements”).
272. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., No.
0:12–3466–JFA, 2015 WL 3903675, at *8 n.4 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (“[I]n their
case-in-chief, the Defendants would delve into the medical issues involved in each
and every claim for which the Plaintiff–Relators seek recovery, thereby insuring
that the statistical sampling would not significantly shorten the trial.”).
273. Cf. United States v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00604-M, 2016
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put on evidence to defend against a number of claims that the
government has not identified as false amounts to a burden shift,
which itself may constitute a violation of due process.274 The Due
Process Clause’s “constraints” on “governmental decisions which
deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’” should fully apply
here.275
V. Conclusion
The emerging use of statistical sampling for establishing
liability in FCA litigation raises a number of issues addressed in
this Note. The Supreme Court’s previous rulings on statistical
sampling call for an examination of the FCA’s liability
requirements to determine if statistical sampling can satisfy the
Act’s elements.276 Under this analysis, statistical sampling cannot
properly prove violations of the FCA.277
Ultimately, the government attempts to employs statistical
sampling to ease the inconveniences associated with massive FCA
actions.278 Whatever convenience statistical sampling offers, the
fundamental requirements of the FCA preclude its use in this
context.279 This is not to say that the government is without
WL 3449833, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 20, 2016) (deciding the case without reaching
the due process issue, but noting that there was no requirement that the relator
pursue such a large case).
274. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 54 (1996) (recognizing that in a
criminal case, a jury instruction that amounts to a burden shift violates due
process).
275. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
276. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (calling for an examination
of the statute’s elements when determining the suitability of statistical sampling
in this context).
277. See supra IV.B. Statutory Analysis (discussing statistical sampling as it
relates to the FCA’s essential elements).
278. See United States v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 549,
565 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (“[I]t would be impractical for the Court to review each
claim individually.”).
279. As one court recently wrote:
If individual review of each chart were impractical, [the relator] was
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recourse when it overpays for services on a massive scale. For
example, the government may use statistical sampling to recover
overpayments in an administrative recovery proceeding, where the
FCA’s statutory requirements are not in play.280 As courts consider
whether statistical sampling can ever establish FCA liability
moving forwards, the arguments and analysis should center on
whether sampling can establish the FCA’s essential elements.
Because the FCA requires individualized proof for each false claim,
courts addressing this issue in the future should find that
statistical sampling cannot establish liability under the FCA.

not required to pursue all potential false claims submitted in fourteen
states over nearly a decade, of which she did not have personal
knowledge. These choices, made by [the relator], do not reduce her
burden to produce reliable evidence of liability.
United States v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00604-M, 2016 WL
3449833, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 20, 2016).
280. See supra II.D.1. Administrative Overpayment Recovery (discussing
sampling in the administrative recovery context).

